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Abstract—In this paper, we study diffusion social learning over
weakly-connected graphs. We show that the asymmetric flow
of information hinders the learning abilities of certain agents
regardless of their local observations. Under some circumstances
that we clarify in this work, a scenario of total influence (or
“mind-control”) arises where a set of influential agents ends up
shaping the beliefs of non-influential agents. We derive useful
closed-form expressions that characterize this influence, and
which can be used to motivate design problems to control it.
We provide simulation examples to illustrate the results.
Index Terms—Weakly-connected networks, social learning,
Bayesian update, diffusion strategy, leader-follower relationship.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORKS
Social interactions among networked agents influence the
beliefs of agents about the state of nature. For example, in
deciding whether the state of nature, denoted by θ, is either
θ = 1 or θ = 0, an agent k observes some data whose
probability distribution is dependent on the unknown θ and,
additionally, consults with its neighboring agents about their
opinion on the most plausible value for θ. By combining their
local measurements with the information from their neighbors,
agents update their belief about θ continuously.
There are two main categories of models that have been
proposed to examine this evolving interaction process [2], [3].
In the first (Bayesian learning) category, the agents rely on
some priors and on Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs [2],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. In the second (non-Bayesian learning)
category, agents interact with their neighbors and aggregate
their beliefs into their own [9]–[15]. One notable example of
non-Bayesian learning is [13] where the authors proposed a
consensus-type construction to update the agents’ beliefs. In
this construction, each agent follows the Bayes’ rule to obtain
an intermediate belief and subsequently combines it with the
old beliefs of its neighbors. Under some technical assumptions,
it was shown in [13] that agents following this model can
asymptotically learn the true state.
Motivated by this study, an alternative to the consensus
mechanism was proposed in [15] by relying on diffusion
strategies due to their enhanced performance and stability
ranges, especially in scenarios that involve continuous learning
[16], [17]. In the diffusion-based model, each agent combines
its intermediate belief with the updated (rather than old)
beliefs of its neighbors. Results in [15] established that agents
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are also able to asymptotically learn the underlying state under
the diffusion strategy.
The models of social interaction studied in [13], [15] as-
sume strongly-connected graphs whereby a path with positive
weights connecting any two agents is always possible and
at least one agent has a self-loop. Over such graphs, social
influences diffuse over time and all agents are able to learn
asymptotically the true state of the environment. This is
possible even when the local observations at the agents may
be of varying quality with some agents being more informed
than others.
A. Weakly-Connected Networks
In this work, we examine social learning over weakly-
connected graphs, as opposed to strongly-connected graphs.
Over a weak topology, there exist some select edges over
which information flows in one direction only, with infor-
mation never flowing back from the receiving agents to the
originating agents. This scenario is common in practice, espe-
cially over social networks. For example, in Twitter networks,
it is not unusual for some influential agents (e.g., celebrities)
to have a large number of followers, while the influential
agent itself may not consult information from most of these
followers. A similar effect arises when social networks operate
in the presence of stubborn agents [10], [18], [19]; these agents
insist on their opinion regardless of the evidence provided by
local observations or by neighboring agents. It turns out that
weak graphs influence the evolution of the agents’ beliefs in
a critical manner. The objective of this work is to clarify this
effect, its origin, and to quantify its implications by means of
closed-form expressions.
B. Social Disagreement
In the previous works [19], [20], the authors examined
the influence of weak graphs on the solution of distributed
inference problems, where agents are interested in learning
a parameter of interest that minimizes an aggregate cost
function. It was shown there that a leader-follower relationship
develops among the agents with the performance of some
agents being fully controlled by the performance of other
agents. In the different context of social learning, this type
of weak connectivity was briefly discussed in [14] where
consensus social learning was analyzed over non-strongly
connected networks. This work considered only the special
case in which all agents in the network are interested in the
same state of nature. A richer and more revealing dynamics
arises when different clusters within the network monitor
different state variables.
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2For example, consider a situation in which a weak graph
consists of four sub-graphs (see future Fig. 5): the two top
graphs are strongly-connected while the other two are weakly-
connected to them. In this case, each of the first two sub-graphs
is able to learn its truth asymptotically. However, the agents
in the lower sub-graphs will be shown to reach a state of
disarray in relation to their true state, with different agents
reaching in general different conclusions and, moreover, with
each of these conclusions being directly determined by the
separate states of the two top sub-graphs. In this work we carry
out a detailed analysis to show how influential agents dictate
the performance of weak components in the network, and
arrive at closed-form expressions that describe this influence in
analytical form (suitable for subsequent design purposes). We
will find that, under some conditions, non-influential agents
will be forced to adopt beliefs centered around the true states
of the influential agents. This situation is similar to the leader-
follower relationship discussed in [19], [20] in the context
of decentralized inference and continuous adaptation. We will
also find that these beliefs differ from one agent to another,
which results in a disturbing form of social disagreement. In
some applications, the influential agents my be malicious as
in [21], [22]. In contrast to these works, in our development,
influential agents do not alter the information they are fusing,
but the nature of what they are sending need not be consistent
with the true state of the receiving agents.
C. Enhancing Self-Awareness
Motivated by the results in the next sections, we will
also incorporate an element of self-awareness into the social
learning process of the network through the introduction of
a scaling factor — see Eq. (72). This factor will enable
agents in the network to assign more or less weight to their
local information in comparison to the information received
from their neighbors. This variation helps infuse into the
network some elements of human behavior. For example, in an
interactive social setting, a human agent may not be satisfied or
convinced by an observation and prefers to give more weight to
their prior belief based on accumulated experiences. This mode
of operation was studied for single stand-alone agents in [11],
[23] and was studied there as a mechanism for self-control.
We will instead examine the influence of self-awareness in the
challenging network setting, where the behavior of the various
agents are coupled together. In particular, we will show that
self-awareness helps agents converge towards a fixed belief
distribution, rather than have their beliefs exhibit an undesired
oscillatory behavior, which reflects their inability to settle on
a decision — see Fig. 7.
Notation: We use lowercase letters to denote vectors, up-
percase letters for matrices, plain letters for deterministic
variables, and boldface for random variables. We also use
(.)T for transposition, (.)−1 for matrix inversion, and ρ(.) for
the spectral radius of a matrix. We use  and  for vector
element-wise comparisons.
II. STRONGLY-CONNECTED NETWORKS
We first review strongly-connected networks and summarize
the results already obtained over this graph topology. Then,
we explain how the results are affected when the underlying
topology happens to be weak and show how a leader-follower
relationship develops. We characterize in some detail the
limiting behavior of this relation and identify the factors that
influence the ability of the social agents to learn the truth or
to follow other influential agents.
v
Fig. 1. An example of a strongly-connected network where µk,i(θ)
denotes the belief (pdf) of agent k at time i.
A. Network Model
Thus, consider a network of N agents connected by some
graph. LetN = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the indexes of the agents
in the network. We assign a pair of non-negative weights,
{ak`, a`k}, to the edge connecting any two agents k and `. The
scalar a`k represents the weight with which agent k scales the
data arriving from agent ` and, similarly, for ak` – see Fig.
1. The network is said to be strongly-connected if there exists
a path with non-zero weights connecting any two agents and,
moreover, there is at least one self-loop, i.e., akk > 0 for some
agent k. Let Nk denote the neighborhood of agent k, which
consists of all agents connected to k. Each agent k scales data
arriving from its neighbors in a convex manner, i.e.,
a`k ≥ 0,
∑
`∈Nk
a`k = 1, a`k = 0 if ` /∈ Nk (1)
We collect the weights {a`k} into an N ×N matrix A. From
condition (1), A is a left-stochastic matrix so that its spectral
radius is equal to one, ρ(A) = 1. Since the network is strongly-
connected, A is also a primitive matrix [16]. It then follows
from the Perron-Frobenius Theorem [24], [25] that A has a
single eigenvalue at one while all other eigenvalues are strictly
inside the unit disc. We denote the right-eigenvector of A that
corresponds to the eigenvalue at one by y, and all entries of
this vector will be strictly positive. We normalize the entries of
y to add up to one, so that y satisfies the following conditions:
Ay = y, 1Ty = 1, y  0 (2)
We refer to y as the Perron eigenvector of A. This network
structure plays an important role in diffusing information
across the network and helps agents in learning the true state.
We describe next the mechanism of this learning.
B. Diffusion Social Learning
Let Θ denote a finite set of all possible events that can
be detected by the network. Let θ◦ ∈ Θ denote the unknown
3true event that has happened, while the other elements in Θ
represent possible variations of that event. The objective of
the network is to learn the true state, θ◦. For this purpose,
agents will be continually updating their beliefs about the true
state through a localized cooperative process. Initially, at time
i = 0, each agent k starts from some prior belief, denoted
by the function µk,0(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. This function represents the
probability distribution over the events θ ∈ Θ. For instance, if
θ1 ∈ Θ then
µk,0(θ1) = Prob(θ = θ1), at time i = 0 (3)
For subsequent time instants i ≥ 1, the private belief of agent
k is denoted by µk,i(θ) ∈ [0, 1]. All beliefs across all agents
must be valid probability measures over Θ. That is, they must
obey the normalization:∑
θ∈Θ
µk,i(θ) = 1, for any i ≥ 0 and k ∈ N (4)
Figure 2 presents an example of a belief distribution µk,i(θ)
defined over Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4}. The agents will update their
private beliefs {µk,i(θ)} over time based on the private signals
they observe from the environment and the information shared
by their social neighbors. We assume that, at each time i ≥
1, every agent k observes a realization of some signal, ξk,i,
whose probability distribution is dependent on the true event
θo, namely, the process {ξk,i} is generated according to some
known likelihood function Lk(·|θ◦) – see Fig.3. We further
assume that for each agent k, the signals {ξk,i} belong to a
finite signal space denoted by Zk and that these signals are
independent over time.
Fig. 2. An example of a belief distribution µk,i(θ).
Fig. 3. Generation of observational signals.
Diffusion social learning, described in [15], provides a
mechanism by which agents can process the information they
receive from their private signals and from their neighbors. A
consensus-based strategy can also be employed, as was done
in [13]. We focus on the diffusion strategy due to its enhanced
performance, as observed in [15] and as further explained in
the treatments [16], [17]. In diffusion learning, at every time
i ≥ 1, each agent k first updates its belief, µk,i−1(θ), based
on its observed private signal ξk,i by means of the Bayesian
rule:
ψk,i(θ) =
µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ξk,i|θ)∑
θ′∈Θ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ξk,i|θ′)
(5)
This step leads to an intermediate belief ψk,i(θ). After learning
from their observed signals, agents can then learn from their
social neighbors through cooperation to compute:
µk,i(θ) =
∑
`∈Nk
a`k ψ`,i(θ) (6)
Subsequently, agent k can use its updated belief, µk,i(θ), to
predict the probability of a certain signal ζk ∈ Zk occurring
in the next time instant i + 1. This prediction or forecast is
based on the following calculation:
mk,i(ζk)
∆
=
∑
θ∈Θ
µk,i(θ)Lk(ζk|θ) = Prob(ξk,i+1 = ζk) (7)
In the sequel, we will be interpreting the diffusion learning
model as a stochastic system of interacting agents, especially
since the operation of this mechanism is driven by the random
observational signals. Thus, we rewrite (5) and (6) as follows
by using boldface letters to refer to random variables.
ψk,i(θ) =
µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ξk,i|θ)∑
θ′∈Θ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ξk,i|θ′)
µk,i(θ) =
∑
`∈Nk
a`k ψ`,i(θ)
(8)
C. Correct Forecasting
When agents in strongly-connected networks follow model
(8) to update their beliefs, the agents will eventually learn the
truth according to the results established in [15]. The argument
there is based on an identifiability condition similar to the one
used in [13], and which is motivated as follows. We assume
first that the agents’ private signals {ξk,i} do not hold enough
information about the true state, so that individual agents
cannot rely solely on their observations to identify θ◦ and
are motivated to cooperate. More specifically, this requirement
amounts to assuming that each agent k has a subset of states
Θk ⊆ Θ for which:
Lk(ζk|θ) = Lk(ζk|θ◦), θ ∈ Θk (9)
for any ζk ∈ Zk. We refer to Θk as the set of indistinguishable
states for agent k. We subsequently assume that through
cooperation with their neighbors, agents are able to identify
the true state by imposing the identifiability condition:⋂
k∈N
Θk = {θ◦} (10)
We refer to this case as θ◦ being globally identifiable. To
prove that agents are able to learn the true state, the analysis
in [15] is based on first showing that agents are able to learn
the correct distribution of incoming signals.
Lemma 1 (Correct Forecasting [15]). Assume that there exists
at least one agent with a positive prior belief about the true
state θ◦, i.e., µk,0(θ
◦) > 0 for some k ∈ N . Then, agents
4are able to correctly predict the distribution of the incoming
signals, namely, for any ζk ∈ Zk and k ∈ N :
lim
i→∞
mk,i(ζk)
a.s.
= Lk(ζk|θ◦) (11)
where a.s.= denotes almost-sure convergence. 
This lemma does not require the identifiability condition
(10). It explores forms of learning that were studied in [11],
[13] and also in [26], [27], which dealt with either learning the
true parameter θ◦ (similar to the setting we are considering)
or learning the distribution of the incoming signal itself.
Correct forecasting does not always imply the ability of
agents to learn the true parameter, θ◦. However, in the case
of strongly-connected networks, this conclusion is true under
some conditions mentioned next (the same implication will
not hold for weakly-connected networks; there, we will show
that correct forecasting does not imply the ability of agents to
learn the truth).
Theorem 1 (Truth Learning [15]). Under the same conditions
of Lemma 1, assume that there exists at least one prevailing
signal ζ◦k for each agent k, namely, that
Lk(ζ
◦
k |θ◦)− Lk(ζ◦k |θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ \Θk (12)
and assume as well that the true state θ◦ is globally iden-
tifiable as in (10). Then, all agents asymptotically learn the
truth, i.e., for any k ∈ N :
lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ
◦) a.s.= 1 (13)

Figure 4 illustrates what it means for a prevailing signal
to exist for an agent k. In this example, the true state θ◦ is
assumed to be θ1. Assume also that for agent k, the set of
distinguishable states is Θ¯k = Θ \ Θk = {θ2, θ3} and the
space of observational signals is Zk = {ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4}. We see
in the example that the signal ζ1 plays the role of a prevailing
signal. This is because when the true state is θ1, the likelihood
of ζ1 is greater than its likelihood when the true state is θ2 or
θ3, i.e.,
Lk(ζ1|θ1) > Lk(ζ1|θ2), Lk(ζ1|θ1) > Lk(ζ1|θ3) (14)
These two conditions are not jointly satisfied for the other
observational signals. The presence of a prevailing signal
provides agent k with sufficient information to identify the
distinguishable set Θ¯k = Θ\Θk. This means that agent k will
be able to assign a zero probability to any θ in this set. Then,
with the help of neighboring agents, and in the presence of the
identifiability condition (10), agent k will be able to discover
the true sate θ◦ in Θk.
III. DIFFUSION LEARNING OVER WEAK GRAPHS
We now examine how learning is affected when the agents
are connected by a weak topology. In simple terms, weakly-
connected networks consist of multiple sub-networks where
at least one sub-network feeds information forward to some
other sub-network but never receives information back from
this sub-network. The example in Fig. 5 illustrates a situation
Fig. 4. An example showing the existence of a prevailing signal ζ1
for agent k.
involving four sub-networks. The agents in each sub-network
observe signals related to their own true states denoted by θ◦1 ,
θ◦2 , θ
◦
3 , and θ
◦
4 . For generality, we do not require the true states
to be the same across the sub-networks. In the figure, each of
the two sub-networks on top is strongly-connected. Therefore,
if their agents follow the diffusion social learning model (8),
they can asymptotically learn their true states. The third and
fourth sub-networks in the bottom receive information from
the top sub-networks without feeding information back to
them. As the analysis will show, this structure results in the
two top sub-networks playing the role of influential entities
that impose their beliefs on the agents in the bottom sub-
networks, regardless of the local information that is sensed by
these latter sub-networks.
A. Weak Network Model
We first review the main features of the weakly-connected
network model from [19], [20]. Consider a network that
consists of two types of sub-networks: S sub-networks and
R sub-networks. Each sub-network in the S family has a
strongly-connected topology. In contrast, each sub-network in
the R family is only required to be connected. This means
that any receiving sub-network has a path connecting any
two agents without requiring any agent to have a self-loop.
Moreover, the interaction between S and R sub-networks is
not symmetric: information can flow from S (“sending”) sub-
networks to R (“receiving”) sub-networks but not the other
way around. We index each strongly-connected sub-network
by s where s = {1, 2, · · · , S}. Similarly, we index each
receiving sub-network by r where r = {S + 1, · · · , S + R}.
Each sub-network s has Ns agents, and the total number of
agents in the S sub-networks is:
NgS
∆
= N1 +N2 + · · ·+NS (15)
5Similarly, each sub-network r has Nr agents, and the total
number of agents in the R sub-networks is:
NgR
∆
= NS+1 +NS+2 + · · ·+NS+R (16)
We still denote by N the total number of agents across all sub-
networks, i.e., N = NgS + NgR. We continue to denote by
N = {1, 2, · · · , N} the indexes of the agents. We assume that
the agents are numbered such that the indexes of N represent
first the agents from the S sub-networks, followed by those
from the R sub-networks. In this way, the structure of the
network is represented by a large N ×N combination matrix
A, which will have an upper block-triangular structure of the
following form [19], [20]:
Subnetworks:1,2,...,S︷ ︸︸ ︷ Subnetworks:S+1,S+2,...,S+R︷ ︸︸ ︷
A1 0 . . . 0 A1,S+1 A1,S+2 . . . A1,S+R
0 A2 . . . 0 A2,S+1 A2,S+2 . . . A2,S+R
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . AS AS,S+1 AS,S+2 . . . AS,S+R
0 0 . . . 0 AS+1 AS+1,S+2 . . . AS+1,S+R
0 0 . . . 0 0 AS+2 . . . AS+2,S+R
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 0 0 0 . . . AS+R

(17)
Fig. 5. An example of a weakly connected network.
The matrices {A1, · · · , AS} on the upper left corner are
left-stochastic primitive matrices corresponding to the S
strongly-connected sub-networks. Each of these matrices has
spectral radius equal to one, ρ(As) = 1. Moreover, each
As has a single eigenvalue at one and the corresponding
right eigenvector has positive entries. We denote it by ys and
normalize its entries to add up to one, i.e., 1Tys = 1.
Likewise, the matrices {AS+1, · · · , AS+R} in the lower
right-most block correspond to the internal weights of the
R sub-networks. These matrices are not necessarily left-
stochastic because they do not include the coefficients over
the links that connect the R sub-networks to the S sub-
networks. Nevertheless, based on results from [28], it was
shown in [19] that for any receiving subnetwork r, it holds
that ρ(Ar) < 1. Moreover, since Ar has non-negative entries
and sub-network r is connected, it follows from the Perron-
Frobenius theorem [24], [25] that Ar has a unique positive real
eigenvalue λr, that is equal to its spectral radius ρ(Ar), and
the corresponding right eigenvector has positive entries. We
denote this eigenvector by yr. We again normalize the entries
of yr to add up to one, 1Tyr = 1:
Aryr = λryr, 1
Tyr = 1, yr  0 (18)
We denote the block structure of A in (17) by:
A
∆
=
[
TSS TSR
0 TRR
]
(19)
This specific structure has one useful property that we will
exploit in the analysis.
Lemma 2 (Limiting Power of A [19]). It holds that:
A∞
4
= lim
n→∞A
n =
[
E EW
0 0
]
(20)
where the NgS × NgS matrix E and the NgS × NgR matrix
W are given by:
W
∆
= TSR(I − TRR)−1 (21)
E
∆
= blockdiag
{
y11
T
N1 , . . . , yS1
T
NS
}
(22)
The matrix W has non-negative entries and the sum of the
entries in each column is equal to one. 
We now examine the belief evolution of agents in weakly-
connected networks. We still denote by Θ the set of all
possible states, and we assume that Θ is uniform across all
sub-networks. However, we allow each sub-network to have
its own true state, which may differ from one sub-network to
another. We denote by θ◦s the true state of sending sub-network
s and by θ◦r the true state of receiving sub-network r, where
both θ◦s and θ
◦
r are in Θ. Therefore, if agent k belongs to a
sub-network s, its observational signals ξk,i will be generated
according to the likelihood function Lk(·|θ◦s). On the other
hand, if agent k belongs to a sub-network r, its observational
signals ξk,i will be generated according to Lk(·|θ◦r).
We already know that the S−type sub-networks are
strongly-connected, so that their agents can cooperate together
to learn the truth. More specifically, according to Theorem 1,
if agent k belongs to sub-network s, then it holds that:
lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ
◦
s)
a.s.
= 1 (23)
The question that we want to examine is how the beliefs of
the agents in the receiving sub-networks are affected. These
agents are now influenced by the beliefs of the S−type groups.
Since this external influence carries information not related
to the true state of each receiving sub-network, the receiving
agents may not be able to learn their own true states. We will
show that a leader-follower relationship develops.
B. Diffusion Social Learning over Weak Graphs
We consider that all agents are following the diffusion
strategy (8) for social learning. In a manner similar to (9), if
6agent k belongs to sub-network r, then we assume that there
exists a subset of states Θk ⊆ Θ such that:
Lk(ζk|θ) = Lk(ζk|θ◦r) (24)
for any ζk ∈ Zk and θ ∈ Θk, i.e., Θk is the set of
indistinguishable states for agent k. Moreover, we assume a
scenario in which the private signals of agents in the receiving
sub-networks are not informative enough to let their agents
discover that the true states of the sending sub-networks do
not represent their own truth. That is, we are assuming for
now the following condition.
Assumption. The true state θ◦s , of each sub-network s ∈
{1, 2, . . . , S}, belongs to the indistinguishable set Θk:
θ◦s ∈ Θk, for any k > NgS (25)

Under (25), we will now verify that the interaction with the
S sub-networks ends up forcing the receiving agents to focus
their beliefs on the true states of the S−type. Later, we will
show that a similar conclusion continues to hold even when
(25) is relaxed.
Thus, let Θ• = {θ◦1 , · · · , θ◦S} denote the set of all true states
of the S−type sub-networks. We are assuming, for notational
simplicity, that the true states {θ◦s} are distinct from each other.
Otherwise, we only include in Θ• the set of truly distinct
states, which will be smaller than S in number. We denote
the complement of Θ• by Θ¯•, such that Θ• ∩ Θ¯• = ∅ and
Θ• ∪ Θ¯• = Θ. We first show that as i → ∞, each receiving
agent k will assign zero belief to any event θ ∈ Θ¯•. This means
that receiving agents will end up searching for the truth within
the set Θ•.
Lemma 3 (Focus on True States of S Sub-Networks). Under
(25), each agent k of any receiving sub-network r eventually
identifies the set Θ¯•, namely, for any θ ∈ Θ¯•:
lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ)
a.s.
= 0 (26)
Proof: See Appendix A. 
This lemma implies that the receiving agents are still able
to perform correct forecasting.
Lemma 4 (Correct Forecasting). Under (25), every agent k
in sub-network r develops correct forecasting, namely,
lim
i→∞
mk,i(ζk)
a.s.
= Lk(ζk|θ◦r), for any ζk ∈ Zk (27)
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Even with the external influence, agent k is still able to
attain correct forecasting because any true state θ◦s of any
sending sub-network, s, belongs to the indistinguishable set
of agent k, i.e., Lk(ζk|θ◦r) = Lk(ζk|θ◦s) from (25) and (24).
Since agents zoom onto the set Θ•, this fact enables correct
forecasting but does not necessarily imply truth learning for
weak graphs, as discussed in the sequel.
The previous two lemmas establish that the belief of each
agent k in sub-network r will converge to a distribution whose
support is limited to θ ∈ Θ•. The next question is to evaluate
this distribution, which is the subject of the following main
result. First let
µsi (θ)
∆
= col
{
µks(1),i(θ),µks(2),i(θ), . . . ,µks(Ns),i(θ)
}
(28)
µri (θ)
∆
= col
{
µkr(1),i(θ),µkr(2),i(θ), . . . ,µkr(Nr),i(θ)
}
(29)
collect all beliefs from agents that belong respectively to
sub-network s and sub-network r, where the notation ks(n)
denotes the index of the n-th agent within sub-network s, i.e.,
ks(n) =
s−1∑
v=1
Nv + n (30)
and n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Ns} and the notation kr(n) denotes the
index of the n-th agent within sub-network r, i.e.,
kr(n) = NgS +
r−1∑
v=S+1
Nv + n (31)
and n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Nr}. Furthermore, let
µS,i(θ)
∆
= col
{
µ1i (θ),µ
2
i (θ), . . . ,µ
S
i (θ)
}
(32)
µR,i(θ)
∆
= col
{
µS+1i (θ),µ
S+2
i (θ), . . . ,µ
S+R
i (θ)
}
(33)
collect all belief vectors respectively from all S−type sub-
networks and from all R−type sub-networks.
Theorem 2 (Limiting Beliefs for Receiving Agents). Under
(25), it holds that
lim
i→∞
µR,i(θ) = W
T
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
(34)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
We expand (34) to clarify its meaning and to show how the
beliefs are distributed among the elements of Θ•. We already
know from the result in Theorem 1 that, for each agent k of
sending sub-network s, µk,i(θ) converges asymptotically to
an impulse of size one at the location θ = θ◦s . Thus, we write:
lim
i→∞
µsi (θ) = eθ,θ◦s
∆
=
{
1Ns , if θ = θ
◦
s
0Ns , otherwise
(35)
where 1Ns denotes a column vector of length Ns whose
elements are all one. Similarly, 0Ns denotes a column vector
of length Ns whose elements are all zero. Hence,
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ) = col
{
eθ,θ◦1 , eθ,θ◦2 , . . . , eθ,θ◦S
}
(36)
Now, let wTk denote the row of W
T that corresponds to agent
k in sub-network1 r. We partition it into
wTk =
[
wTk,N1 w
T
k,N2
. . . , wTk,NS
]
(37)
where the {N1, N2, . . . , NS} are the number of agents in
each sub-network s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. By examining (34), we
conclude that the distribution for each agent k in an R−type
sub-network converges to a combination of the various vectors
{eθ,θ◦s }, namely,
1The real index of the row of WT that corresponds to agent k is k−NgS .
7lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ) = qk(θ)
∆
=
S∑
s=1
wTk,Nseθ,θ◦s (38)
Observe that, from this equation, to get qk(θ◦s), the elements of
the corresponding block in wk, i.e., wk,Ns , should be summed.
Now, if we consider that multiple sending sub-networks have
the same true state, then to get qk(.) at this true state, the
elements of all corresponding blocks in wk will need to be
summed. Note that this is a valid probability measure in view
of Lemma 2, i.e., ∑
θ∈Θ•
qk(θ) = 1 (39)
Note also that if it happens that θ◦s = θ
◦ for all s, then
qk(θ
◦) = 1 and qk(θ) = 0 for all θ 6= θ◦, and in this case,
sending agents can be seen as helping receiving agents to find
the true state. We also observe that the beliefs of agents in
the receiving sub-networks differ from one agent to another,
since for each agent k, qk(θ) depends on wk. This means that
the external influence has created social disagreement in the
receiving sub-networks.
We therefore established that the beliefs of receiving agents
converge to a distribution whose support is limited to the
true states of the sending sub-networks. We will refer to
this situation as a total influence or “mind-control” scenario
where the learning of the R−subnetworks is fully dictated by
the S−subnetworks. When all agents follow model (8) and
when assumption (25) is satisfied, this total influence scenario
arises. Although the private signals of the receiving agents
are supposed to hold information regarding their own true
state, however, under assumption (25), these signals are not
informative enough, so that agents are naturally driven to be
under the influence of the sending sub-networks.
We are interested now in knowing whether this total in-
fluence situation can still occur when assumption (25) is
not satisfied anymore. When this is the case, sending agents
may not be able to totally control the beliefs of receiving
agents anymore. Before establishing the analytical results, and
before showing how self-awareness can alter this dynamics, we
provide an illustrative example.
C. Implications of Violating Condition (25)
We consider a network consisting of three agents, with the
first two playing the role of influential agents and the third one
acting as a receiving agent. The combination matrix is chosen
as follows:
A =
 1 0 0.10 1 0.2
0 0 0.7
 (40)
We denote by θ◦1 the true state for agent 1, by θ
◦
2 the true
state for agent 2, and by θ◦3 the true state for agent 3 so
that Θ = {θ◦1 , θ◦2 , θ◦3}. The observational signal for all three
agents is either a head “H” or a tail “T”. In order for agents
1 and 2 to learn their true states asymptotically, we need to
ensure that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. One of
these requirements is the identifiability condition (10), which
requires that the intersection of the indistinguishable sets (9)
Fig. 6. A weakly connected network and the corresponding combi-
nation policy (40).
of all agents in a given sending sub-network s must be the
singleton {θ◦s}. In this example, each sending sub-network
consists of only one agent, so that condition (10) reduces
to Θ1 = {θ◦1} for the first agent and Θ2 = {θ◦2} for the
second agent. In other words, since agents 1 and 2 do not
have neighbors to communicate with, they must rely solely on
their observational signals to learn the truth. This is feasible
when for agents 1 and 2 no state is observationally equivalent
to their true state (or indistinguishable). Using the definition
of the indistinguishable set (9), Θ1 = {θ◦1} translates into the
following requirement for agent 1:
L1(ζ1|θ◦1) 6= L1(ζ1|θ◦2) and L1(ζ1|θ◦1) 6= L1(ζ1|θ◦3) (41)
for any ζ1 ∈ {H,T}. Similarly, Θ2 = {θ◦2} translates into the
following requirement for agent 2:
L1(ζ2|θ◦2) 6= L1(ζ2|θ◦1) and L1(ζ2|θ◦2) 6= L1(ζ2|θ◦3) (42)
for any ζ2 ∈ {H,T}. For this example, we are choosing the
likelihood functions arbitrarily but satisfying (41) for agent 1
and (42) for agent 2. For instance, we select for agent 1,
L1(H|θ◦1) = 0.10, L1(H|θ◦2) = 0.35, L1(H|θ◦3) = 0.45 (43)
and set L1(T |θ) = 1− L1(H|θ) for any θ ∈ Θ. Likewise for
agent 2, we select
L2(H|θ◦1) = 0.10, L2(H|θ◦2) = 0.20, L2(H|θ◦3) = 0.30 (44)
and set L2(T |θ) = 1 − L2(H|θ) for any θ ∈ Θ. Before
analyzing the beliefs of agent 3 when (25) is not satisfied, we
consider first the case in which this assumption is satisfied.
In this way, we will be able to compare what is happening in
both cases. More specifically, following (25), we consider first
that θo1 and θ
o
2 belong to the indistinguishable set of agent 3
denoted by Θ3, i.e., {θ◦1 , θ◦2} ∈ Θ3. This means, according to
the definition of the indistinguishable set (9), that
L3(ζ3|θ◦1) = L3(ζ3|θ◦3) and L3(ζ3|θ◦2) = L3(ζ3|θ◦3) (45)
for any ζ3 ∈ {H,T}. According to model (8), the intermediate
belief of agent 3 is given by:
ψ3,i(θ) =
µ3,i−1(θ)L3(ξ3,i|θ)(∑
θ′∈Θ µ3,i−1(θ′)
)
L3(ξ3,i|θ)
= µ3,i−1(θ) (46)
We observe in this example that the private signals of agent 3
end up not contributing to its intermediate belief. As a result,
it is only the beliefs of agents 1 and 2 that affect the belief of
8agent 3, so that:
µ3,i(θ) = a13ψ1,i(θ) + a23ψ2,i(θ) + a33ψ3,i(θ)
= a13µ1,i(θ) + a23µ2,i(θ) + a33µ3,i−1(θ) (47)
In writing (47), we used the fact that the intermediate beliefs
for agents 1 and 2 coincide with their updated beliefs since, in
this example, agents 1 and 2 have no neighbors. Thus, since
a33 < 1,
lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ) =(
a13
1− a33
)
lim
i→∞
µ1,i(θ) +
(
a23
1− a33
)
lim
i→∞
µ2,i(θ) (48)
from which we conclude that
lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ
◦
1) =
a13
1− a33 (49)
lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ
◦
2) =
a12
1− a33 (50)
lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ
◦
3) = 0 (51)
This total influence result is expected to occur according to
Theorem 2, when assumption (25) is satisfied.
Let us consider now the case in which assumption (25) is
not satisfied. This means that θ◦1 and θ
◦
2 do not need to both
belong to the indistinguishable set Θ◦3 of agent 3, i.e.,
L3(ζk|θ◦1) 6= L3(ζk|θ◦3) or L3(ζk|θ◦2) 6= L3(ζk|θ◦3) (52)
for any ζk ∈ {H,T}. In this example, we study the worst case
scenario in which both conditions in (52) are met (even if we
consider other situations in which only one of these conditions
is met, we still arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, the
belief of agent 3 will not reach a fixed distribution). We select
arbitrarily the values for the likelihood function of agent 3,
but in a way that these values satisfy both conditions in (52).
For instance, we select
L3(H|θ◦1) = 0.4, L3(H|θ◦2) = 0.3, L3(H|θ◦3) = 0.8 (53)
In this case, the belief for agent 3 will be updated as:
µ3,i(θ) = a13µ1,i(θ) + a23µ2,i(θ) + a33ψ3,i−1(θ)
= a13µ1,i(θ) + a23µ2,i(θ)+
a33
L3(ξ3,i|θ)µ3,i−1(θ)∑
θ′∈Θ µ3,i−1(θ′)L3(ξ3,i|θ′)
(54)
We see here how this equality is different from (47), where the
last term ψ3,i−1(θ) holds information about θ
◦
3 that contradicts
with the information held in the other terms. We now show
by contradiction that in this case, agent 3 will not converge to
a fixed distribution. Assume, to the contrary, that the beliefs
of agent 3 reach the following distribution:
lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ
◦
1) = b, lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ
◦
2) = c, lim
i→∞
µ3,i(θ
◦
3) = d (55)
for some fixed non-negative constants b, c and d satisfying
b+ c+ d = 1 (56)
We know that, as i→∞, agents 1 and 2 approach their true
states so that by evaluating (54) at θ◦1 when i→∞, we get:
b = a13 +
a33L3(ξ3,i|θ◦1)b
bL3(ξ3,i|θ◦1) + cL3(ξ3,i|θ◦2) + dL3(ξ3,i|θ◦3)
(57)
Evaluating (54) at θ◦2 when i→∞:
c = a23 +
a33L3(ξ3,i|θ◦2)c
bL3(ξ3,i|θ◦1) + cL3(ξ3,i|θ◦2) + dL3(ξ3,i|θ◦3)
(58)
Evaluating (54) at θ◦3 when i→∞:
d =
a33L3(ξ3,i|θ◦3)d
bL3(ξ3,i|θ◦1) + cL3(ξ3,i|θ◦2) + dL3(ξ3,i|θ◦3)
(59)
Then, from (59), we have:
d =
0.56d
0.4b+ 0.3c+ 0.8d
, if observation is H (60)
d =
0.14d
0.6b+ 0.7c+ 0.2d
, if observation is T (61)
Then, either d = 0 or
0.4b+0.3c+0.8d = 0.56 and 0.6b+0.7c+0.2d = 0.14 (62)
However, conditions (62) contradict the fact that we must have
(0.4b+ 0.3c+ 0.8d) + (0.6b+ 0.7c+ 0.2d) = b+ c+ d
(56)
= 1 (63)
We conclude that d = 0. Thus, condition (56) reduces to:
b+ c = 1 (64)
With regards to the values of b and c, we know from (57) that
b = 0.1 +
0.28b
0.4b+ 0.3c
, if observation is H (65)
b = 0.1 +
0.42b
0.6b+ 0.7c
, if observation is T (66)
That is, the scalars b and c must satisfy
0.28
0.4b+ 0.3c
=
0.42
0.6b+ 0.7c
(67)
The denominators are related as follows:
(0.4b+ 0.3c) + (0.6b+ 0.7c) = b+ c
(64)
= 1 (68)
Thus,
0.28
0.4b+ 0.3c
=
0.42
1− (0.4b+ 0.3c) (69)
This leads to
0.4b+ 0.3c =
0.28
0.28 + 0.42
= 0.4 (70)
so that from (65), we have
b = 0.1 +
0.28
0.4
b (71)
Thus, b = 13 , and since 0.4b + 0.3c = 0.4, then c =
8
9 .
However, b+c = 119 , which contradicts (64). We conclude that
the beliefs of agent 3 cannot reach a fixed distribution. This
conclusion is illustrated in Fig. 7, which plots the evolution
of beliefs of agent 3 for all θ ∈ Θ. It is clear from the figure
how the contradictory information conveyed by the influential
9agents and the private signals do not lead agent 3 to approach
a fixed belief. This also means that agents 1 and 2 cannot
fully control agent 3. However, if agent 3 decides to limit
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Fig. 7. Evolution of the beliefs of agent 3 over time for the case in
which condition (25) is not satisfied.
the contribution of its private signal on the update of its
intermediate belief, will agents 1 and 2 be able to totally
influence agent 3? In other words, will the total influence
scenario arise again even if assumption (25) is not satisfied?
We show next that this is possible by incorporating an element
of self-awareness into the learning process.
IV. DIFFUSION LEARNING WITH SELF-AWARENESS
We are therefore now motivated to modify the diffusion
strategy (8) by incorporating a non-negative convex combi-
nation γk,i. This factor enables agents to assign more or
less weight to their local information in comparison to the
information received from their neighbors. Specifically, we
modify (8) as follows:
ψk,i(θ) = (1− γk,i)µk,i−1(θ)
+ γk,i
µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ξk,i|θ)∑
θ′∈Θ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ξk,i|θ′)
µk,i(θ) =
∑
`∈Nk
a`kψ`,i(θ)
(72)
where γk,i ∈ [0, 1] is a scalar variable. Observe that the
intermediate belief ψk,i(θ) of agent k is now a combination
of its prior belief, µk,i−1(θ), and the Bayesian update. The
scalar γk,i represents the amount of trust that agent k gives
to its private signal and how it is balancing this trust between
the new observation and its own past belief. This weight can
also model the lack of an observational signal at time i.
Model (72) helps capture some elements of human behavior.
For example, in an interactive social setting, a human agent
may not be satisfied or convinced by an observation and
prefers to give more weight to their prior belief based on
accumulated experiences. This model was studied for single
agents in [11], [23] and was motivated as a mechanism for
self-control and temptation. The agent might observe a private
signal at some time that can move this agent away from its
current conviction. The agent can control this temptation by
increasing the weight given to its prior belief or it can change
its opinion by giving more weight to its Bayesian update,
which is based on the private signal.
We next analyze model (72) over weakly-connected graphs
and establish two results. The first result is related to the
sending agents and the second result is related to the receiving
agents.
Lemma 5 (Correct Forecasting with Self-Awareness). Assume
that lim
i→∞
γk,i 6= 0 and the same conditions of Lemma 1.
Then, self-aware sending agents develop correct forecasts of
the incoming signals, namely, result (11) continues to hold.
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Theorem 3 (Truth Learning by Self-Aware Sending Agents).
Under the same assumptions of Theorem 1, self-aware send-
ing agents learn the truth asymptotically and condition (13)
continues to hold.
Proof: The argument is similar to the proof given in [15]. 
We therefore find that sending agents, whether self-aware
or not, are always able to learn the truth. With regards to
receiving agents, we now have the following conclusion. For
each agent k in a receiving sub-network r, we write γk,i =
τk,iγmax, where γmax are both positive scalars less than 1, and
γmax = supk,i γk,i.
Theorem 4 (Learning by Self-Aware Receiving Agents). The
beliefs of self-aware receiving agents are confined as follows:
lim sup
i→∞
µR,i(θ) WT
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
+ γmaxC1NgR (73)
lim inf
i→∞
µR,i(θ) WT
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
− γmaxC1NgR (74)
where C ∆= (I − TTRR)−1 is an NgR ×NgR matrix.
Proof: See Appendix E. 
This final result coincides with that of Theorem 2, but with
an additional O(γmax) term. This means that if each receiving
agent chooses the γ−coefficient to be small enough, then its
belief converges to the same distribution (34) of Theorem 2.
When agent k gives a small weight to its Bayesian update, it
means that it is giving its current signal ξk,i a reduced role to
play in affecting its belief formation at time i, and it is instead
relying more heavily on its prior belief µk,i−1(θ) and on its
communication with its neighbors. When agent k continues
to give less importance to any current signal it is receiving,
its belief update will be mainly affected by its interaction
with influential agents and its neighbors that are also under
the influence of sending agents. Therefore, over time, these
circumstances will help establish a leader-follower relationship
in the network. In other words, the receiving sub-networks will
be driven away from the truth and be under total indoctrination
by the influential agents.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We illustrate the previous results for weakly-connected
networks. We assume that the social network has N = 8 agents
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interconnected as shown in Fig. 8, which corresponds to the
following combination matrix:
A =

0.2 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 0
0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 0.2 0 0.4
0.3 0.4 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 0
0 0 0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0 0
0 0 0 0.6 0.7 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.3
0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.1

(75)
Fig. 8. A weakly connected network consisting of three sub-networks
and the corresponding combination policy (75).
We assume that there are 3 possible events Θ =
{θ◦1 , θ◦2 , θ◦3}, where θ◦1 is the true event for the first sending
sub-network, θ◦2 is the true event for the second sending sub-
network, and θ◦3 is the true event for the receiving sub-network.
We further assume that the observational signals of each agent
k are binary and belong to Zk = {H,T} where H denotes
head and T denotes tail. We consider two cases. In the first
case, we assume that agents update their belief according to
the model described in (8) and that assumption (25) is met.
In the second case, we assume that agents follow the second
model described in (72) where assumption (25) is not met.
A. First Case
In this first case, the likelihood of the head signals for each
agent k is selected as the following 3× 8 matrix:
L(H) =
 5/8 3/4 1/3 7/8 5/8 1/3 1/4 5/85/8 1/4 1/6 7/8 2/3 1/3 1/4 5/8
1/4 3/4 1/6 1/3 2/3 1/3 1/4 5/8

where each (j, k)-th element of this matrix corresponds to
Lk(H/θj), i.e., each column corresponds to one agent and
each row to one network state. The likelihood of the tail
signal is L(T ) = 13×8 − L(H). We observe from L(H) that
assumption (25) is met here where for agent k in the receiving
sub-network (k > 5) we have Lk(ζk|θ◦1) = Lk(ζk|θ◦2) =
Lk(ζk|θ◦3) for both cases in which ζk is either head or tail.
Assumption (25) is met here because the true state of the
first sending sub-network θ◦1 belongs to the indistinguishable
set of any receiving agent k in the receiving sub-network 3,
i.e., Lk(ζk|θ◦1) = Lk(ζk|θ◦3), and the true state of the second
sending sub-network θ◦2 belongs to the indistinguishable set
of any receiving agent k, i.e., Lk(ζk|θ◦2) = Lk(ζk|θ◦3), where
k = 6, 7, 8. We further assume that each agent starts at time
i = 0 with an initial belief that is uniform over Θ and then
updates it over time according to the model described in (8).
Then, we know from [15] that limi→∞ µk,i(θ
◦
1) = 1 for
k = 1, 2, 3 and limi→∞ µk,i(θ
◦
2) = 1 for k = 4, 5. Now
for the agents of the receiving sub-network, we need first to
compute:
WT = (I − TTRR)−1TTSR
=
 0 0.4045 0.1489 0.4466 00 0.5267 0.1183 0.3550 0
0 0.7099 0.0725 0.2176 0
 (76)
The first row of WT corresponds to agent 6, the second row
to agent 7 and the third row to agent 8. Now each row is
partitioned into two blocks: the first block is of length N1 = 3
that corresponds to sub-network 1 of true state θ◦1 and the
second block is of length N2 = 2 that corresponds to sub-
network 2 of true state θ◦2 . Then, according to Theorem 2, we
can compute the belief at θ◦1 for each receiving agent at steady
state, by taking the first block in the agent’s corresponding row
and summing its elements:
lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ
◦
1) =

0 + 0.4045 + 0.1489 = 0.5534, k = 6
0 + 0.5267 + 0.1183 = 0.6450, k = 7
0 + 0.7099 + 0.0725 = 0.7824, k = 8
Likewise, we can compute the belief at θ◦2 for each receiving
agent at steady state, by taking the second block in the agent’s
corresponding row and summing its elements:
lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ
◦
2) =

0.4466 + 0 = 0.4466, k = 6
0.3550 + 0 = 0.3550, k = 7
0.2176 + 0 = 0.2176, k = 8
We run this example for 7000 time iterations. We assigned
to each agent an initial belief that is uniform over {θ◦1 , θ◦2 , θ◦3}.
Figures 9 shows the evolution of µk,i(θ
◦
1) and µk,i(θ
◦
2) of
agents in the receiving sub-network (k = 6, 7, 8). These
figures show the convergence of the beliefs of the agents in
the receiving sub-networks to the same probability distribution
already computed according to the results of Theorem 2.
Figure 10 shows this limiting distribution over Θ for all
receiving agents.
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Fig. 9. Evolution of agent k belief over time for k = 6, 7, 8 in the
first case.
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B. Second Case
We now assume that the likelihood of the head signals for
each agent k is selected as the following 3× 8 matrix:
L(H) =
 5/8 3/4 1/3 7/8 5/8 1/2 2/3 3/85/8 1/4 1/6 7/8 2/3 1/3 3/5 5/7
1/4 3/4 1/6 1/3 2/3 2/5 1/4 1/3

We observe now from L(H) that assumption (25) is not met
here where for agent k in the receiving sub-network (k > 5)
we have Lk(ζk|θ◦1) 6= Lk(ζk|θ◦2) 6= Lk(ζk|θ◦3) for both cases
in which ζk is either head or tail. Assumption (25) is not
met here because θ◦1 does not belong to the indistinguishable
set of any receiving agent k in the receiving sub-network
3, i.e., Lk(ζk|θ◦1) 6= Lk(ζk|θ◦3), and θ◦2 does not belong
to the indistinguishable set of any receiving agent k, i.e.,
Lk(ζk|θ◦2) 6= Lk(ζk|θ◦3), where k = 6, 7, 8. We further assume
that agents now update their beliefs according to the model
described in (72). We choose γk,i = 0.4 for k = 1, 2, 3
(agents of the first sending sub-network) at any i, γk,i = 0.5
for k = 4, 5 (agents of the second sending sub-network) at
any i and γk,i = 0.1 for k = 6, 7, 8 (agents of the receiving
sub-network) at any i. We also assume that each agent starts
at time i = 0 with an initial belief that is uniform over Θ.
Then, we know from Theorem 3 that limi→∞ µk,i(θ
◦
1) = 1
for k = 1, 2, 3 and limi→∞ µk,i(θ
◦
2) = 1 for k = 4, 5. Figure
11 shows the evolution of µk,i(θ
◦
1) and µk,i(θ
◦
2) of agents in
the receiving sub-network (k = 6, 7, 8). These figures show
how the beliefs of the receiving agents are confined around
the probability distribution already computed in the previous
case.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we studied diffusion social learning over
weakly-connected networks. We examined the circumstances
under which receiving agents come under the total influence
of sending agents. This total influence is reflected by forcing
the receiving agents to focus their beliefs on the set of true
states for the sending sub-networks. We determined for each
receiving agent what the exact probability distribution is in
steady-state. We also illustrated the results with examples.
Future work will focus on how the network can be designed so
that receiving agents adopt specific limiting beliefs, and how
receiving agents can detect the external influence and limit it.
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Fig. 11. Evolution of agent k belief over time for k = 6, 7, 8 in the
second case.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The proof is based on showing first that for any receiving
agent k, it holds that
lim
i→∞
∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ) = 1 (77)
From this result, we will conclude that lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ) = 0
for all θ ∈ Θ¯•. To examine the evolution of agents’ beliefs
toward Θ•, we associate with each agent k the following regret
function:
QW (µk,i)
∆
= − log
(∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ)
)
(78)
We view µk,i(θ) as a stochastic process that depends on the
sequence of random observations {ξk,j} over all k and for
all j ≤ i. Therefore, we shall examine agent k’s individual
performance by taking the expectation of QW (µk,i) over these
observations. More specifically, we define agent k’s risk at
time i as
JW (µk,i)
∆
= EFiQW (µk,i) (79)
where Fi denotes the of sequence {ξk,j} over all k and for
all j ≤ i.
Proof of Lemma 3. We start with agent k’s risk at time i
defined in (79), where k > NgS . Recall that N = NgS +NgR
represents the total number of agents in the whole network:
JW (µk,i)
= −EFi log
(∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ)
)
(8)
= −EFi log
[
N∑
`=1
∑
θ∈Θ•
a`kψ`,i(θ)
]
(5)
= −EFi log
NgS∑
`=1
a`k
∑
θ∈Θ•
ψ`,i(θ)
+
N∑
`=NgS+1
a`k
∑
θ∈Θ• µ`,i−1(θ)L`(ξ`,i|θ)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)

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(a)
= −EFi log
NgS∑
`=1
a`k
∑
θ∈Θ•
ψ`,i(θ)
+
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`k
∑
θ∈Θ• µ`,i−1(θ)L`(ξ`,i|θ)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
]
(b)
= −EFi log
NgS∑
`=1
a`k
∑
θ∈Θ•
ψ`,i(θ)
+
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`k
∑
θ∈Θ• µ`,i−1(θ)L`(ξ`,i|θ◦r)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
]
(c)
≤ −EFi
NgS∑
`=1
a`k log
(∑
θ∈Θ•
ψ`,i(θ)
)
+
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`k
log
(∑
θ∈Θ• µ`,i−1(θ)
)
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦r)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
]
= −
NgS∑
`=1
a`kEFi log
(∑
θ∈Θ•
ψ`,i(θ)
)
−
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`kEFi log
(∑
θ∈Θ•
µ`,i−1(θ)
)
−
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`kEFi log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦r)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
(79)
=
NgS∑
`=1
a`kJ
W (ψ`,i) +
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`kJ
W (µ`,i−1)
−
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`kEFi log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦r)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
(d)
=
NgS∑
`=1
a`kJ
W (ψ`,i) +
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`kJ
W (µ`,i−1)
− EFi−1
(
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`k
Eξ`,i
(
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦r)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
))
(e)
≤
S+R∑
r=S+1
∑
`∈Ir
a`kJ
W (µ`,i−1) +
NgS∑
`=1
a`kJ
W (ψ`,i) (80)
where
• in the third equality, we only expanded the second term
that corresponds to receiving agents in order to study its
behavior. We did not do the same thing with the first term
because it corresponds to sending agents and we already
know how that ψ`,i(θ) will converge with time for any
sending agent `, as later shown in (88).
• in step (a), we split the second summation corresponding
to receiving agents into R groups, with each group
corresponding to one receiving sub-network. Moreover,
the symbol Ir denotes the set of indexes of agents that
belong to receiving sub-network r;
• in step (b), we replaced L`(ξ`,i|θ) by L`(ξ`,i|θ◦r). This
follows from assumption (25): for any θ that is in Θ•,
L`(ζ`|θ) = L`(ζ`|θ◦r), for any ζ` ∈ Z`;
• in step (c), we applied the convexity property of − log(.)
since the elements {a`k} form a convex combination for
each agent k;
• in step (d), we applied the conditional expectation prop-
erty
(
EX [g(X)] = E Y [EX|Y [g(X)|Y ]]
)
as follows:
EFi log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
= EFi−1
(
EFi|Fi−1
(
log
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
|Fi−1
))
= EFi−1
(
Eξ`,i
(
log
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
|Fi−1
))
(81)
• in step (e), we replaced the previous expression in (d)
by an upper bound using the non-negativity of the KL-
divergence from L`(.|θ◦r) to m`,i−1(.) [29].
To continue with the argument we collect the risk values of
S−agents and R−agents into two vectors as follows:
JW (ψS,i)
∆
= col
{
JW (ψ1,i), . . . , J
W (ψNgS ,i)
}
(82)
JW (µR,i)
∆
= col
{
JW (µNgS+1,i), . . . , J
W (µN,i)
}
(83)
Then, from (80), we write the vector inequality:
JW (µR,i)  TTRRJW (µR,i−1) + TTSRJW (ψS,i) (84)
We now establish the convergence of this inequality. We first
consider the term JW (ψS,i). We know that agents in the
sending sub-networks can learn the truth if the assumptions
mentioned in Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are met. One of
the assumptions is that at least one agent in each strongly-
connected sub-network s starts with a non-zero prior belief
at θ◦s . Let us denote this agent by `o. As shown in [15], this
condition guarantees that for large enough i, µk,i(θ
◦
s) > 0 for
all k in this sub-network. Accordingly, it also holds that for
large enough i agents in this sub-network will have nonzero
intermediate beliefs at θ◦s , i.e., ψk,i(θ
◦
s) > 0. This implies
that JW (ψS,i)  0 and TTSRJW (ψS,i)  0 for large enough
i since the elements of TSR are all non-negative. Let us now
consider agent k′ of a receiving sub-network r, which has
agent `′ from sending sub-network s in its neighborhood. After
large enough i,
µk′,i(θ
◦
s) =
∑
`∈Nk′
a`k′ψ`(θ
◦
s) ≥ a`′k′ψ`′(θ◦s) > 0 (85)
Then, in the next time step, all agents of sub-network r that
have agent k′ in their neighborhood will have non-zero belief
at θ◦s . Since the received sub-network r is connected, it follows
that after large enough i,
µk,i(θ
◦
s) > 0 =⇒
∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ) > 0 (86)
for all agents k that belong to sub-network r. We employ the
same argument for all other receiving sub-networks. Therefore,∑
θ∈Θ• µk,i(θ) > 0 for any k > NgR so that J
W (µR,i)  0
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for large enough i. Thus,
0  JW (µR,i)  TTRRJW (µR,i−1) + TTSRJW (ψS,i) (87)
Furthermore, any agent k in any sending sub-network
s can learn asymptotically its own true state, so that
limi→∞ µk,i(θ
◦
s)
a.s.
= 1 implies
lim
i→∞
ψk,i(θ
◦
s) = lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ
◦
s)Lk(ξk,i|θ◦s)∑
θ∈Θ µk,i(θ)Lk(ξk,i|θ)
= lim
i→∞
Lk(ξk,i|θ◦s)
Lk(ξk,i|θ◦s)
a.s.
= 1 (88)
The denominator in the second equality follows from the fact
that limi→∞ µk,i(θ
◦
s)
a.s.
= 1 for any agent k of sending sub-
network s. It follows that lim
i→∞
∑
θ∈Θ• ψk,i(θ)
a.s.
= 1 for any
k ≤ NgS . Therefore, lim
i→∞
JW (ψS,i) = 0. Moreover, since
ρ(TRR) < 1 [19], we conclude that limi→∞ JW (µR,i) = 0
which implies that
lim
i→∞
JW (µk,i) = 0, ∀ k > NgS (89)
As previously discussed after large enough i,∑
θ∈Θ• µk,i(θ) > 0 so that − log
(∑
θ∈Θ• µk,i(θ)
) ≥ 0.
Using the definition of JW (µk,i) in (79), it holds that
JW (µk,i) represents the expectation over Fi of non-negative
quantities. Hence, result (89) implies
lim
i→∞
− log
(∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ)
)
= 0 ; lim
i→∞
∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ)
a.s.
= 1
(90)

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Assume agent k belongs to sub-network r and ζk ∈ Zk:
lim
i→∞
mk,i(ζk) = lim
i→∞
∑
θ∈Θ
µk,i(θ)Lk(ζk|θ)
(a)
= lim
i→∞
∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ)Lk(ζk|θ)
(b)
=
(
lim
i→∞
∑
θ∈Θ•
µk,i(θ)
)
Lk(ζk|θ◦r)
a.s.
= Lk(ζk|θ◦r) (91)
where step (a) follows from the result of Lemma 3 and step
(b) follows from assumption (25). 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The intermediate belief of any agent k is given by:
ψk,i(θ) =
µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ξk,i|θ)
mk,i−1(ξk,i)
(92)
Let us assume that agent k belongs to receiving sub-network
r. Using Lemma 4, we have for any θ ∈ Θ•:
lim
i→∞
ψk,i(θ) = lim
i→∞
µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ξk,i|θ)
mk,i−1(ξk,i)
= lim
i→∞
µk,i−1(θ)
(93)
We can establish the same property for any agent in a sending
sub-network because (91) was already proven for sending
agents in [15]. It follows that, for any agent k,
lim
i→∞
µk,i(θ) = lim
i→∞
∑
`∈Nk
a`kµk,i−1(θ) (94)
for any θ ∈ Θ•. We defined the vectors µS,i(θ) in (33) and
µR,i(θ) in (29). Then,
lim
i→∞
[
µS,i(θ)
µR,i(θ)
]
= AT
(
lim
i→∞
[
µS,i−1(θ)
µR,i−1(θ)
])
(95)
from which we obtain using the structure of A in (19):
lim
i→∞
µR,i(θ) = T
T
SR lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ) + T
T
RR lim
i→∞
µR,i(θ) (96)
We then conclude that
lim
i→∞
µR,i(θ) = (I − TTRR)−1TTSR
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
= WT
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
(97)

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We start by introducing some notation and definitions. Since
we are now interested in examining the evolution of the
agents’ beliefs toward the true state, let us introduce the true
probability mass function p(θ) defined over Θ, namely:
p(θ) = δθ,θ◦
∆
=
{
1, if θ = θ◦
0, otherwise
(98)
The evolution of the belief of agent k toward the true state
can be analyzed by computing the KL divergence of µk,i(θ)
from p(θ) at each time instant i. We therefore introduce the
new regret function for agent k at time i as:
Q(µk,i)
∆
= DKL(p||µk,i) =
∑
θ∈Θ
p(θ) log
(
p(θ)
µk,i(θ)
)
= − logµk,i(θ◦) (99)
where we used the convention that 0 log 0 = 0. We shall again
define agent k’s individual risk at time i as
J(µk,i)
∆
= EFiQ(µk,i) = −EFi logµk,i(θ◦) (100)
where Fi denotes the history of {ξk,j} over all k and for all
j ≤ i. We then assess the overall network performance by
considering the weighted aggregate risk:
J(µi)
∆
=
N∑
k=1
y(k)J(µk,i) (101)
where the {y(k)} denote the entries of the Perron vector, y,
of the primitive left-stochastic matrix A, as defined by (2).
To prove Lemma 5, namely, the ability of agents to arrive
at correct forecasts, we prove first the convergence of the
sequence {J(µi)} as i → ∞. This convergence will then
imply the correct forecasting by agents.
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Proof of Lemma 5: We assumed in the statement of the lemma
that at least one agent `o starts with a non-zero prior belief
at θ◦, i.e., µ`o,0(θ
◦) > 0. As shown in [15], this condition
guarantees that for large enough i, µk,i(θ
◦) > 0 for all k ∈ N ,
which implies that the terms of the time sequence {Q(µk,i)}
assume nonnegative values for large i and for any agent k.
Thus, the time sequences {J(µk,i)} and {J(µi)} are non-
negative for large enough i. Let us now expand agent k’s risk
for large time i:
J(µk,i) = −EFi logµk,i(θ◦)
= −EFi log
(∑
`∈Nk
a`kψ`,i(θ
◦)
)
(a)
≤ −EFi
[∑
`∈Nk
a`k log
(
ψ`,i(θ
◦)
)]
(72)
= −EFi
[∑
`∈Nk
a`k log
(
(1− γ`,i)
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)
)
+ γ`,i
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
))]
(b)
≤ −EFi
[∑
`∈Nk
a`k
(
(1− γ`,i) log
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)
)
+ γ`,i log
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
))]
= −EFi
(∑
`∈Nk
a`k log
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)
))
− EFi
(∑
`∈Nk
a`kγ`,i log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
))
(c)
= −EFi
(∑
`∈Nk
a`k log
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)
))− EFi−1(∑
`∈Nk
a`kγ`,iEξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
(d)
≤ −
∑
`∈Nk
a`kEFi log
(
µ`,i−1(θ
◦)
)
=
∑
`∈Nk
a`kJ(µ`,i−1) (102)
where
• steps (a) and (b) follow from the convexity of − log(.);
• step (c) follows from the conditional expectation property(
EX [g(X)] = E Y [EX|Y [g(X)|Y ]]
)
as in (81);
• step (d) follows by replacing the expression in (c) by
an upper bound using the non-negativity of the KL di-
vergence from L`(.|θ◦) to m`,i−1(.) according to Gibb’s
inequality [29].
Accordingly, the overall performance at time i, satisfies:
J(µi)
(a)
≤
N∑
k=1
y(k)
∑
`∈Nk
a`kJ(µ`,i−1)
(b)
=
N∑
`=1
y(`)J(µ`,i−1) = J(µi−1) (103)
where step (a) follows from (102), and step (b) follows from
(2). Therefore, the sequence {J(µi)} is a decreasing sequence.
But, since this sequence is non-negative, we conclude that
{J(µi)} converges to a real number according to the mono-
tone convergence theorem of real numbers [30].
We now establish the ability of agents to attain correct
predictions. From step (c) in (102), we get
J(µk,i) ≤
∑
`∈Nk
a`kJ(µ`,i−1)
−EFi−1
(∑
`∈Nk
a`kγ`,iEξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
(104)
Then, rearranging terms,∑
`∈Nk
a`kJ(µ`,i−1)− J(µk,i) ≥
EFi−1
(∑
`∈Nk
a`kγ`,iEξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
(105)
Scaling by y(k), summing over k, and using (2) we get:
N∑
`=1
y(`)J(µ`,i−1)−
N∑
k=1
y(k)J(µk,i) ≥
EFi−1
(∑
`∈Nk
y(`)γ`,iEξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
(106)
Then,
J(µi−1)− J(µi) ≥
EFi−1
(∑
`∈Nk
y(`)γ`,iEξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
(107)
Since {J(µi)} is a convergent sequence, it is also a Cauchy
sequence [30] and, therefore,
0 = lim
i→∞
[
J(µi−1)− J(µi)
] ≥ lim
i→∞
EFi−1
(∑
`∈Nk
y(`)γ`,iEξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
≥ 0
(108)
where the rightmost inequality follows from the non-negativity
of the KL-divergence. We conclude that:
lim
i→∞
EFi−1
(∑
`∈Nk
y(`)γ`,i
Eξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
])
= 0 (109)
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Since we assumed that lim
i→∞
γk,i 6= 0 for any k, y(`) > 0
from (2), and Eξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
]
≥ 0 from the
non-negativity of the KL-divergence, then
lim
i→∞
Eξ`,i
[
log
(
L`(ξ`,i|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ξ`,i)
)
|Fi−1
]
= 0 (110)
Thus,
lim
i→∞
∑
ζ`∈Z`
L`(ζ`|θ◦) log
(
L`(ζ`|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ζ`)
)
= 0 (111)
Let
f`,i−1
∆
=
∑
ζ`∈Z`
L`(ζ`|θ◦) log
(
L`(ζ`|θ◦)
m`,i−1(ζ`)
)
(112)
where f`,i represents the KL-divergence of m`,i(.) from
L`(.|θ◦). We know from Gibb’s inequality [29] that the KL-
divergence of a probability distribution from another distribu-
tion achieves the value zero only when the two distributions
are equal. Since the KL-divergence f`,i converges to zero as
i → ∞ and L`(.|θ◦) is a fixed distribution, this implies that
m`,i(.) should converge, i.e., its limit exists and it takes the
following value:
lim
i→∞
m`,i(ζ`) = L`(ζ`|θ◦) (113)
for any ζ` ∈ Z`. Since this result is achieved for any realization
of observational signals Fi−1, we conclude that:
lim
i→∞
m`,i(ζ`)
a.s.
= L`(ζ`|θ◦) (114)
for any ` ∈ N and any ζ` ∈ Z`. 
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According to model (72), the intermediate belief of any
agent k in a receiving group can be written as follows:
ψk,i(θ) = µk,i−1(θ)
+ γk,i
[
µk,i−1(θ)
(
Lk(ξk,i|θ)∑
θ′ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ξk,i|θ′)
− 1
)]
(115)
We assume that γk,i = τk,iγmax, where τk,i and γmax are both
nonnegative scalars less than one. Then,
ψk,i(θ) = µk,i−1(θ)
+ γmax
[
τk,iµk,i−1(θ)
(
Lk(ξk,i|θ)∑
θ′ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ξk,i|θ′)
− 1
)]
(116)
We define the auxiliary function:
hk,i(θ, ζk)
∆
= τk,iµk,i−1(θ)
(
Lk(ζk|θ)∑
θ′ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ζk|θ′)
− 1
)
(117)
where θ ∈ Θ and ζk ∈ Zk, so that
ψk,i(θ) = µk,i−1(θ) + γmaxhk,i(θ, ξk,i) (118)
Therefore,
µk,i(θ) =
∑
`∈Nk
a`kψ`,i(θ)
=
∑
`∈Nk
a`kµ`,i−1(θ) + γmax
∑
`∈Nk
a`kh`,i(θ, ξ`,i)
(119)
Let us introduce the vectors:
hS,i(θ, ξS,i)
∆
= col
{
h1,i(θ, ξ1,i), . . . ,hNgS ,i(θ, ξNgS ,i)
}
(120)
hR,i(θ, ξR,i)
∆
=
col
{
hNgS+1,i(θ, ξNgS+1,i), . . . ,hN,i(θ, ξN,i)
}
(121)
and,
ξS,i
∆
= col
{
ξ1,i, . . . , ξNgS ,i
}
(122)
ξR,i
∆
= col
{
ξNgS+1,i, . . . , ξN,i
}
(123)
Recall that we defined the vectors µS,i(θ) in (33) and
µR,i(θ) in (29). Then, we have
[
µS,i(θ)
µR,i(θ)
]
= AT
([
µS,i−1(θ)
µR,i−1(θ)
]
+ γmax
[
hS,i(θ, ξS,i)
hR,i(θ, ξR,i)
])
(124)
Using the structure of A in (19), it follows that
µR,i(θ) = T
T
RRµR,i−1(θ) + T
T
SRµS,i−1(θ)
+ γmax
(
TTSRhS,i(θ, ξS,i) + T
T
RRhR,i(θ, ξR,i)
)
(125)
We study the convergence of this recursion. Let
ζS
∆
= col
{
ζ1, . . . , ζNgS
}
, ζR
∆
= col
{
ζNgS+1, . . . , ζN
}
(126)
We will first establish that
γmax
(
TTSRhS,i(θ, ζS) + T
T
RRhR,i(θ, ζR)
)
= O(γmax)
(127)
for any θ, ζS and ζR.
Lemma 6. For any k ∈ N , i ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ and ζk ∈ Zk, it
holds that
|hk,i(θ, ζk)| ≤ 1 (128)
Proof: From (117),
hk,i(θ, ζk) = τk,i
(
µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ζk|θ)∑
θ′ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ζk|θ′)
− µk,i−1(θ)
)
(129)
Since τk,i is a nonnegative scalar that is less than one, and
since
0 ≤ µk,i−1(θ)Lk(ζk|θ)∑
θ′ µk,i−1(θ′)Lk(ζk|θ′)
≤ 1 (130)
for any k ∈ N , i ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ and ζk ∈ Zk, we conclude that
hk,i(θ, ζk) ≥ −τk,iµk,i−1(θ) ≥ −µk,i−1(θ) (131)
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and
hk,i(θ, ζk) ≤ τk,i
(
1− µk,i−1(θ)
) ≤ 1− µk,i−1(θ) (132)
Moreover, we know that 0 ≤ µk,i(θ) ≤ 1 for all k, i and θ.
We then conclude that
− 1 ≤ hk,i(θ, ζk) ≤ 1 (133)
From (128), we get for any i ≥ 0 and θ ∈ Θ,∣∣TTSRhS,i(θ, ζS) + TTRRhR,i(θ, ζR)∣∣
 TTSR|hS,i(θ, ζS)|+ TTRR|hR,i(θ, ζR)|
(a)
 TTSR1NgS + TTRR1NgR
(b)
= 1NgR (134)
where (a) follows from (128) and (b) follows from the left-
stochasticity of the combination matrix A. Note that the above
inequality, as well as the absolute value operator, are element-
wise. Moreover, 1NgR is a vector of all ones of size NgR and
1NgS is a vector of all ones of size NgS . Thus,
γmax
∣∣TTSRhS,i(θ, ζS) + TTRRhR,i(θ, ζR)∣∣  γmax1NgR (135)
for all i ≥ 0. This fact leads to the desired conclusion (127).
In this way, equality (125) implies:
µR,i(θ)  TTRRµR,i−1(θ) + TTSRµS,i−1(θ) + γmax1NgR
µR,i(θ)  TTRRµR,i−1(θ) + TTSRµS,i−1(θ)− γmax1NgR
(136)
We have ρ(TTRR) < 1 and limi→∞ µS,i(θ) exists since agents
of sending sub-networks can learn asymptotically the truth.
Then,
lim sup
i→∞
µR,i(θ)  TTRR
(
lim sup
i→∞
µR,i−1(θ)
)
+ TTSR
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i−1(θ)
)
+ γmax1NgR
lim inf
i→∞
µR,i(θ)  TTRR
(
lim inf
i→∞
µR,i−1(θ)
)
+ TTSR
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i−1(θ)
)
− γmax1NgR (137)
It follows that
lim sup
i→∞
µR,i(θ) WT
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
+ γmaxC1NgR
lim inf
i→∞
µR,i(θ) WT
(
lim
i→∞
µS,i(θ)
)
− γmaxC1NgR
(138)
where C = (I − TTRR)−1. 
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